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A Gitea Intrusion and a Leaked Deployment Key

/ 2 min read

Early on October 29, a production server sent an alert about password attempts. The SSH logs showed 105 successful key-based logins from the same source, 13 of them to the root account.

Tracing those logins back led to two Gitea CI workflows that had been modified to send out the credentials they could access, including the SSH key used for production deployments. CVE-2026-60004 may have been the initial entry point. The investigation did not turn up a record of the first requests. Gitea security advisory

At the time, a relay server handled reverse proxying and SSH forwarding and also served as a Tailscale exit node. A Tailscale subnet route let authorized devices reach services on the private network. The investigation found unusual logins on the relay, a login to the router’s root account, and suspicious proxy containers running on machines inside the network. The route the attacker took into the private network remained unclear. Tailscale subnet router documentation

The attacker also gained access to the Whistle console on a development Mac. Whistle rules can serve the contents of local files in responses. The attacker used that feature to read files on the Mac, exposing some credentials. The rules could read SSH private keys, browser session files, and cloud service credentials. Which files were actually taken remains unclear. The active rule groups were later disabled, and access to the proxy was restricted to the Mac itself. Whistle file rule documentation

CI was shut down, the affected keys were revoked, and connections between the affected machines were cut. Logs and snapshots were saved. After a test restore from a database backup succeeded, the production services moved to a temporary machine. They moved back once the original server had been reinstalled.